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DICKINSON LAW1 REVIEW

TREND IN PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY
IN PENNSYLVANIA
It has been conceded by students of the law that the principle of stare decisis
has a well defined place in our legal system; it is one method of capitalizing
on the wisdom, research, and opinions of the great minds of the past. But too
strict an adherence to this principle can cause a costly hesitation or at least a reluctance on the part of our judges to alter what has been the law for so many
years, even though it is felt by them to require a change.
One such consequence of this dogmatic adherence is the presumption of
legitimacy, and its rebuttal, which seems to have recently proceeded a step further in its process of evolution to a point which more nearly reaches the ends of
reality and justice.
History of the Presumption of Legitimacy
If one would trace the presumption of legitimacy from its origin until
the present time, it might appear that a definite pattern has been followed, originally giving little significance to the presumption, later more significance to it, -and
finally, our modern view, which appears to be allowing a slight retreat to the
original status.
Originally, a legitimate child was one born in lawful wedlock; that is, one
whose mother was a married woman at the time of its birth. The paternity aspect
of the problem was given little significance. Later, certain exceptions were admitted, which gave limited consideration to the husband. First, he would not be
considered the father if he were physically incompent; later, he would not be
considered the father if the were beyond the "four seas" of the kingdom; later
if he lived at a distance which made intercourse improbable. Finally, the father's
right was admitted as an element of legitimacy; the definition had now become,
"one whose parents were inter-married before he was born."'
Then the presumption arose that a child born in wedlock was presumed to be
the child of the mother and father, that is, that the husband was presumed to be
the father. This presumption, the one about which this note is concerned, was
not looked on by all the judges as a proper or even a logical one; for as is noted
2
in the dissent of Page v. Dennison:
"The presumption of the paternity from the nuptials alone is a falling back upon the very principles of the old, absurd, and abandoned
decisions; and we might as well say that gestation might be complete in
three months or three weeks; for when we abandon natural presumptions
and go to fictions, we are simply disregarding the truth; and then the
more plainly false they are, the less liable are they to mislead, by being
supposed to be intended for truth."
1 Page v. Dennison, 1 Grant 377 (1856).
2 Ibid., at page 383.
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Treatment In England
In the very early common law in England, the presumption of legitimacy
was so complete and strong that no evidence could be introduced to show that
a child which was born in wedlock was illegitimate. There then became known
in England a doctrine called "the Four Seas Rule," which continued to be quoted
even in our Pennsylvania decisions until the evolution in Pennsylvania began
to take a more concrete form. In Commonwealth v. Shepherd it was said: 3
"In old times it seems to have been holden that a child born of a
married woman whose husband was within the four seas which bound
the kingdom could not be considered as illegitimate."
But in commenting on that rule, Pennsylvania decisions noted its unfairness to the husband, and began to get away from the definiteness of such
a dogmatic standard:'
"This was unreasonable. When a husband had access to his wife it is
right that no evidence short of absolute impotence of the husband should
bastardize the issue. But where they live at a distance from each other
so that access is very improbable, the legitimacy of the child should be
decided upon a consideration of all the circumstances."
In England, during the period between 1811 and 1846, there appeared a
trend away from the idea of such a strong desire to uphold the presumption
to the extent alluded in "the Four Seas Rule." In what was called the Banbury
Peerage case, 5 sexual intercourse was presumed to have taken place between
the husband and wife if the child was born in lawful wedlock, unless it could
be proved to the satisfaction of the decider of the question, that sexual intercourse did not take place within any such time as the husband could by laws of
nature be the father of such child. While in 1846, in the English case of Hargrave
v. Hargrave,6 the decision was reached whereby the presumption could be wholly
removed by proper and sufficient evidence of any one of four things: that the
husband was impotent; that he was so absent as to have no communication or
intercourse with the mother; or was entirely absent during the period within
which the child must have been begotten; or proof, clear and satisfactory, that
there was no sexual intercourse.
It is interesting to view a case noted in Thayer's Treatise on Evidence7 in
which he discusses an English case, which was decided in the House of
Lords and in which Lord Campbell commented: 8
"So strong is the presumption of legitimacy that if a white woman
have a mulatto child, although the husband is white and the supposed
paramour black, the child is presumed legitimate, if there were any opportunties for intercourse."
Dulsky v. Susq. Collieries Co., 116 Pa. Super. 520, 525, 177 A. 60 (1935).
4 Dulsky v. Susq. Collieries Co., 116 Pa. Super. 520, 525, 177 A. 60 (1935).
a 1 Simm. & Stu. 153.
6 Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beaver 553, 555.
7 THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREAISE ON EVIDMNCE 346 (1898).
s Piers v. Piers, 13 Jurist 569, 572 (1849).
3
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Mr. Thayer, in his treatise, seems to say that Lord Campbell must have
injected into the situation other elements, for what the noted Lord said did
not appear to be the law. As Mr. Thayer continues:9
"It never was a rule that the mere opportunity for intercourse between an English husband and his wife gave rise to a presumption that
he was the father of h'er child under the specific circumstances named.
On the contrary, it was a just contention in North Carolina in 1872,
when a colored child of a white married woman was exhibited to the
jury as 'proof that it was impossible' that the white husband of the
woman could be its father." 10
Later Mr. Thayer quotes a portion of a case which may have an effect on
Pennsylvania decisions, since it has been found of such importance as to be
1
quoted in the latest expression of the law of evidence in Pennsylvania, although
2
it is not a case decided in this Commonwealth. The case is Nolting v. Holt,'
flaxenblue
eyed
'a
in which a white woman was married to Charles Nolting,
haired German' to whom she had born nine children, and later gave birth to
several mulatto children. The children were claiming as the illegitimate children
of Holt, the defendant, a negro.
"The mother was permitted to testify that the negro was the father
of the children, and a finding of illegitimacy was sustained notwithstanding the fact that there was no proof of non-access by the husband
during the period of likely conception."
This presents another interesting problem, which will be more fully discussed
later in the note, that of allowing the parent to testify in an action which might
tend to bastardize the child.
A Word About Presumptions
"It is one of the commonest errors to misapprehend the scope and
limitations of the ordinary rules and maxims of presumptions; and to
attribute to them a mistaken quality and force . .. "I
14
In Pennsylvania, in the case of Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co. the
court attempts to show how and in what manner presumptions arise. The court
enumerates presumptions, and in the course of the opinion places the presumption
of legitimacy in a grouping of those firmly based upon the generally known
results of wide human experience. Professor Wigmore notes as to presumptions
as a caution:'"
"A presumption must be distinguished from 'prima facie evidence.'
The latter signifies properly an amount of evidence which is sufficient
in the particular case to pass the judge. But the term has been used
9 See note 7, supra.
10 Warlish v. White, 76 N. Car. 175.

11 BROWN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE 33 (1949).
12 Nolting v. Holt, 113 Kan. 495, 215 P. 281.
13 See note 7, supra.

14 Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 504, 17 A. 644 (1935).
15 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Students' Edition 453 et seq. (1935).
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by some judges to signify the equivalent of a presumption, i.e., to authorize the judge to d ct a verdict for the proponent. This ambiguity of
the term makes trouble in reading the judicial opinions; but a scrutiny
of the proceedings in each case will usually disclose the sense in which
the term is being used."
When the courts begin to speak of conclusive presumptions, it appears
to this writer that they are attempting to twist the true meaning of presumptions
into something which presumptions could not logically adduce. The courts are
then creating fictions, for if something is merely a presumption, surely there
is room for error; otherwise, it would be no mere presumption, but a fact. Professor Wigmore says this use of "conclusive presumptions" is usually a mere fiction
to disguise a rule of substantive law, and when they are not fictions, they are
usually repudiated by modern courts.
Pennsylvania's View of the Presumption and its Rebuttal
There appears to be little doubt in this Commonwealth that the presumption
of legitimacy does exist. 16
But the courts of Pennsylvania have shifted from the original view that
necessitated showing that the husband had no opportunity at all to have intercourse with his wife at the time of conception,17 to a more realistic view as expressed in the more recent cases in which the courts are looking for what probably
happened, rather than what might remotely have occurred.18
19
As the court said in Commonwealth v. Di Matteo:
"To rebut the presumption of legitimacy it is not necessary that nonaccess of the husband to the wife be absolutely proven."
Compare this quotation from a statement from the opinion in Dennison v.
Page:20
"Where it is shown that the husband might have begotten the child,
the presumption of legitimacy is conclusive."
The modern trend in Pennsylvania, which is supported by many cases both
among the sister states and the fed'eral government, was given a comment of ap21
proval by Justice Cardozo in the celebrated case of In Re Findley:
"Countervailing evidence may shatter the presumption though the possibility of access
is not susceptible of exclusion to the point of utter demon22
stration."
16 Dennison v. Page, 2 Pa. 420, 422, 72 Am. Dec. 644 (1859); Comm. v. Kerr, 150 Pa.
Super. 598, 603 29 A.2d 240 (1942) ; Thorn Estate, 353 Pa. 603, 606, 46 A.2d 258 (1946).
17 Dennison v. Page, supra.

Is Comm. v. Di Matteo, 124 Pa. Super. 277, 188 A. 245 (1936); Comm. v. Gantz, 128

Pa. Super. 97, 193 A. 72 (1937).

19 Comm. v. Di Matteo, see note 18, supra.
20 Dennison v. Page, supra.; Italics Supplied.
21 In Re Findlay, 170 N. E. 471, 473.
22 Pa. Cases: Comm. v. Levandowski, 134 Pa. Super. 477, 481, 4 A.2d 201 (1938); Comm.
v. Gantz, 128 Pa. Super. 97, 193 A. 72 (1937); Comm. v. Atherton, 129 Pa. Super. 64, 194 A.
779 (1937); Dulsky v. Susq. Collieries Co., 116 Pa. Super. 520, 177 A. 60 (1935).
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The most recent statement of the law in Pennsylvania on this subject is
found in the case of Commonwealth v. Baeone,28 in which the court reiterates
in strong terms the position of our courts on this subject:
"Legitimacy is not to be sustained by a 'sacrifice of probabilities in
a futile quest for certainty.' Common sense and reason are not to be
shattered in order to uphold the presumption of legitimacy."
Competency of the Spouses
In regard to the competency of spouses to testify as to non-access, there appears to be a problem of unique character in that the law has been rigid so long
that a change would necessarily have to be wrought in the legislature. However,
it must be noted that certain courts have deviated slightly from the original path
of the rule, and such a trend could slowly bring about a gradual evolution which
might eventually alter the rule in the courts themselves.
A recent statement of the law as to competency was made in Commonwealth
v. Di Matteo:2 4
"Husband and wife are incompetent to testify as to non-access of the
husband, where the effect of that testimoney will be to bastardize the
issue of the wife."
This statement has appeared in Pennsylvania cases from our earliest reports
until the present time, 25 although the reasons for its existence do not seem to
justify the faith placed upon it by the courts.
It appears difficult to this writer to comprehend a clear and logical basis for
excluding the testimony of the spouses, when they and they alone in many cases,
are the persons who could definitely give the true situation as to access of the
husband at the time of conception.
Professor Wigmore notes in his Student's Edition:28
"A child's legitimacy is presumed from his birth during wedlock; and
this presumption holds unless husband's non-access during the period of
gestation is specifically proved. But here, by a peculiar and irrational rule,
neither parent is allowed to testify to the non-access."
The courts in Pennsylvania have given reasons from time to time for the
existence of the rule. One such statement may be found in Tioga County v. South
Creek Twp. :2
"Many reasons have been given for the rul'. Prominent among them
is the idea that the admission of such testimony would be unseemly
28 Comm. v. Barone, 164 Pa. Super. 73, 63 A.2d 132 (1949).
24 Comm. v. Di Matteo, see note (18) supra.
25 Comm. v. Strickler, I Browne (Pa.) xlvii appx. Dennison v. Page, see note (16), supra.
26 WIGMORE oN EVIDENCE, Students' Edition 1459, (5) p. 466.

27 Tioga County v. South Creek Twp., 75 Pa. Super. 433 (1874).
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and scandalous, and this is not so much from the fact that it reveals
immoral conduct on the part of the parents, as because of the effect it
may have on the child, who is in no fault, but who must nevertheless
be the chief sufferer thereby. That the parents should be permitted to
basterdize the child is a proposition which shocks our sense of right and
decency, and hence the rule of law which forbids it."
28
Another more simple reason was noted in the case of The King v. Kea:
"Public policy excludes the mother in bastardy and pauper cases from
being a witness to bastardize her childern, by proving the non-access of
her husband.
Lowrie, J., in the Dennison Case, supra,29 calls this rule a "dead and arbitrary
law;" and after a consideration of the practical results of such a rule, this writer
is inclined to share the learned justice's sentiments.

It is a noted fact that in Pennsylvania the husband or the wife is permitted
to show an adulterous and criminal connection; when this is done we must face
the reality that the line of demarcation upon which we stand is indeed a narrow
one. As is noted in several cases on this point:08
"A married woman whose husband is living and undivorced is competent to testify in support of a charge of bastardy to. the criminal connection with defendant although she is not competent to prove non-access
of her husband."
Also, in the case of Commonwealth v. Wibner it was stated: 3'
"In a prosecution for the failure to contribute to the support of a
child born out of wedlock-it is not error for the court to allow the introduction of evidence of the relations between the accused and the mother
of the child in order to prove his parenthood."
And in the case of Commonwealth v. Atherton the court said:82

"However, either may testify as to the fact of intercourse with another, and if non-access may be proved by other witnesses, there may be
sufficient evidence to justify a finding that someone other than the
husband is the father of the child."
It is the opinion of this writer that the conclusions arrived at by legal reasoning processes do not always fall satisfactorily on the conscience of the lay
public; decisions often seem harsh and incorrect to the layman for strict legal
principles are clouded from his mind by his emotions.
28 King v. Kea, 11 East 132, 103 Eng. Rep. 954 (1809) ; Comm. v. Shepherd, 6 Binney 291
(1879) ; King v. Sourton, 5 Ad. & E. 180, 11 Eng. Rep. 1134 (1836).
29 See note (I), supra.
80 Comm. v. Gantz, supra; see also Comm. v. Atherton, supra.
81 Comm. v. Wibner, 73 Pa. Super. 349 (1873).
32 Comm. v. Gantz, supra; see also Comm. v. Atherton, supra.
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The recent war, and the separation of married persons because of it, has
presented complications beyond description because of such rules as the disallowance of testimony of th.2 spouses in such cases above.
When the law would have a married man support a child which he knows
to be not his own, or would have a married woman demand support from one
other than her spouse, the parties should be heard on the question of who the
father really is. For by not permitting them to speak, we often close the door
on the only persons who can truly know of access. The law says that non-access
is to be proved by other witnesses. In most cases of marital intercourse there are
only two witnesses possible and these two witnesses are also the only ones in most
cases who can know as a fact whether sexual intercourse took place between them
within the period of gestation. They should be heard.33
ARTHUR L. GOLDBERG
83 Note: An interesting account of this problem giving the position of other states in regard to this presumption can be found in Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. IX p. 448, §2527.

